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What is the relation between the economic and theological realms? 
 “None at all,” says a certain strand of received wisdom.  Such received wisdom is 
rooted in the Enlightenment project of the conquest of nature.  Starting from the assumption 
that human physiology has determinate needs, and human labour has relatively uniform 
productive capacities, a certain ‘economic nature’ consisting in the production, distribution 
and consumption of goods and services might be known through its regularities and managed 
for the sake of health, satisfaction and power.1  Of course, this physiological model of the 
economy was disrupted by changing capacities for production enabled by inventions and the 
organisation of labour, as well as by changing preferences in consumption, not to mention the 
very changes in distribution wrought by management for the sake of profit.2  Nevertheless, a 
restriction of attention to distribution alone, where labour only appears under the form of 
supply and need only appears under the form of preference or demand, was far more 
promising for the constitution of an economic science – and with a few assumptions about 
marginal changes in production and preference, equations could be constructed to represent 
the laws of market, operating according to an inner necessity, like a machine.  As a self-
regulating machine, the economic realm functions independently of the theological.  Having 
consolidated the separation between fact and value in the practical sphere, it was a 
providential boon that such a machine appeared to reunite them by promoting freedom to 
exchange as one wishes, enacting justice by enabling the choice of exchanges which meet the 
wishes of all parties and compensating each with desired benefits, and ensuring the most 
efficient distribution of resources by compensating the most those who create wealth.  It was 
a further providential boon that such a market tended towards equilibrium between supply 
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and demand, ensuring a stable order.  Nevertheless, as an immanent machine, such a market 
was rarely mistaken for a god in spite of its inheritance of divine responsibilities.  Even if 
such a pure market was more of an ideal rather than a reality,3 such perceived benefits created 
a moral and political obligation to extend and restructure economic life to conform more 
closely to this market: enclosing land, colonising near and distant places, ensuring the right to 
property, allowing freedom to trade and price fluctuations, removing prior social obligations 
that had restricted the mobility of people, goods, services and capital, supplying an 
appropriate quantity of the means of payment as well as tax obligations, encouraging prudent 
self-management through bookkeeping, and erecting state authorities to oversee development 
as the march to freedom.  When chaos and instability followed in the wake of such progress, 
the ideal of the free market enabled the blame to be placed on external interference and 
immoral conduct.  In all this, construction of the free, rational, public space of the market 
consisted in setting it free from the constraints of religious obligation.  On this account, the 
economic realm, by right, should have nothing to do with the religious realm. 
 For the purposes of this discussion, however, the most pertinent aspect of the market 
is its machine-like necessity: as an immanent, self-regulating system, it needs no external 
guidance (beyond ensuring its freedom to operate), while it, in turn, may regulate the conduct 
of the material life of production and consumption.4  Just as God was no longer appealed to in 
order to explain the natural order discovered by science, so God was no longer appealed to in 
order to legitimate the practical order regulated by economy.  If religion could still have a 
role in one’s inner life, worldly necessity governed material life.  For certain Neoplatonic and 
Protestant strands of Christianity, this liberation of the market also enabled a liberation of 
theology to focus on its own strictly spiritual concerns.  Even those who, noting the excesses 
and failures of free markets in practice, sought to modulate and direct the market by means of 
a Christian social ethic, reproduced the fundamental dichotomy: an active and spontaneous 
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subject manages a passive, material object.  And perhaps even those who displace the priority 
of the subject in favour of the priority of culture may be suspected of reproducing this 
dichotomy once more.  For them, material things are cultural products; cultures are rarely 
regarded as the product of material things.  Those who subsume even markets and money 
back into culture, at the expense of economic determinism, may still operate by means of a 
dichotomy enabled by the rise of economic science.  The conquest of nature appears 
complete, and, whether theology is regarded as legitimate master, ideological, or irrelevant, it 
is understood as in any case different from the ways of the world. 
 Now, once the ideal of a self-regulating market started to collapse – one might 
mention economic crises in advanced economies, advances in the discipline of economics 
itself to take into account behavioural, knowledge-based, and financial factors,5 
deconstructions of the metaphysics of subject and object, among many other factors – then 
what is at stake is the emergence of an entire field of inquiry which has hitherto been 
invisible.  This field is the common domain between theology and economics.  While 
Kathryn Tanner and Devin Singh, in line with the wider intellectual turn from the subject to 
culture, primarily locate this common domain as a field of discourse,6 Tanner’s work may 
enable us to entirely rethink what economic life is, while Singh’s work may enable us to 
rethink what Christian theology is.  For what has emerged since around the Great Financial 
Crisis starting in 2007 is a field called ‘economic theology’ whose primary task is to 
illuminate each of these realms in terms of the other.  This is entirely different from the 
perennial task of a Christian social ethics, commenting on the conduct of Christians and 
institutions within economic life, and quite different from any purported dialogue between 
economists and theologians: the aim is to articulate what has been invisible to economists and 
theologians due to their Enlightenment assumptions.  It is the rawness and newness of this as 
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yet unstructured field which explains both my enthusiasm for their respective projects and the 
difference of my own approach. 
 In Christianity and the New Spirit of Capitalism, Tanner identifies the common 
ground for contestation between Christianity and finance-dominated capitalism in the realm 
of “spirit”  identified as “cultural forms – beliefs, values and norms – that accompany 
capitalism to help shape subjects and social relations more generally to meet its 
requirements.” (9)  If Tanner’s account of economic life differs so much from those given by 
economists in terms of markets as well as those given by political theorists in terms of 
freedom, rights, property, classes and laws, this is because she turns toward culture as that 
which directs economic conduct by encouraging people to see what they are doing as 
meaningful, valuable or inevitable.  In what is by far the most cogent and useful summary of 
research on the current era of finance-dominated capitalism I have read, Tanner describes a 
system of governing the conduct of others through their own self-government in line with 
external demands.  Tanner offers a bleak picture of a culture of self-exploitation in order to 
survive within a framework of ever-tightening competition and economic stagnation, at odds 
with those sunny celebrations of prosperity and liberty theoretically enabled by free market 
competition.  The decisive difference can be found here: “Unlike simple commercial markets 
for exchange (of the sort Adam Smith talked about), it is not just that one does not intend the 
good of others; what one does out of self-interest is not in fact good for them when markets 
are organized by direct personal rivalry.” (191)  The pertinent difference between financial 
and other markets is that in finance there is only one broad kind of good – expected profit 
measured against perceived risk – such that all exchanges involve a degree of direct rivalry.  
The current era is finance-dominated, not merely because finance occupies an increasing 
proportion of economic life or that it is often the most profitable, but because finance is 
decoupled from being an intermediary in the “real economy” of goods and services while at 
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the same time regulating conduct within such an economy through debt.  Finance-dominated 
capitalism is debt-driven capitalism, controlling the conduct of corporations, governments 
and individuals alike.  Tanner exposes the dark underside of market discipline: efficiency 
savings are in fact achieved by shifting exposure of risks onto others while at the same time 
requiring more from them.  Corporations are disciplined by finance in the form of both debt 
and equity, meeting interest payments or driving up shareholder value; individuals are 
disciplined by finance in the form of student loans, mortgages, car loans, credit cards and 
payday loans; governments are disciplined by finance in the form of their costs of borrowing 
to fund their basic provision of services.  Instead of corporations conducting themselves in 
the interests of all stakeholders, or individuals conducting their lives in line with their 
preferences, or governments conducting their policies in line with the will of the people, the 
demands of economic necessity – that is, the capacity to maintain and repay debt – take 
priority over any other considerations.  The most effective way of disciplining conduct and 
extracting profits is a kind of rigorous work ethic: an identification of the achievement of 
self-realization and self-fulfilment with an ability to meet the external demands placed upon 
one at any moment.  In contrast to the old Protestant work ethic of work for work’s sake, such 
work is not self-directing; instead, one’s very self is a kind of economic property, human 
capital, the ability to generate further profit and maximise one’s personal growth. 
 In this new context, profitable capital consists primarily in culture: the government of 
others through their own self-government.  There are good reasons for turning to culture in 
this way.  Instead of economic life being shaped simply by meeting demands for goods and 
services, it is shaped by meeting the demands of making profits and repaying debts.  Instead 
of political life being shaped simply by democratic deliberation, it is shaped by conformity to 
economic necessity in the form of international capital markets.  Instead of individual life 
being shaped simply by autonomously-generated life projects, it is shaped by the project of 
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becoming human and moral capital, ready to meet the demands of the moment.  In each case, 
the common feature is the government of others through their own self-government – a 
structured process of self-cultivation.  Moreover, if one pulls back the veil of finance to 
inquire about the creditors who are pulling all the strings, one merely discovers exactly the 
same kind of human subject and work ethic, indeed, if anything, a subject capable of bearing 
more intense pressures and faster demands.  There is also another reason for finding this 
cultural account compelling: it can be extended beyond the distinctively economic sphere of 
life aimed at profit, being applied for the purpose of intensive management of public 
institutions.  Tanner refers to the contemporary management of universities as a training 
ground for the corporate mentality (76).  The daily life of a professor consists in an exercise 
of pastoral power:  selection of candidates, guidance and coaching towards benchmarks of 
success, grading papers and examinations, awarding competitive grants, scholarships, 
positions and tenure, refereeing journal and book publications.  Each of these mechanisms 
facilitates confession and self-governance, where only the most dedicated can achieve 
success – the aim now being success, rather than autonomous self-cultivation.  Such a culture 
is widely taken for granted; few would wish to return to a liberal model of education with its 
excesses.  In short, given this rejection of liberalism, disciplined self-governance is not 
merely an external imposition: it is an object of desire.  Moreover, it is only natural for 
scholars to identify that which structures their daily experience as that which is at work 
elsewhere. 
 The other aspect of Tanner’s account which I find fascinating and compelling is the 
analysis of conduct in terms of a relation to time and others.  Within the constraints of 
competitive markets, and threatened by the very considerable risks of failure and loss, people 
become bound to an unalterable past, an agreed contract or debt.  To ensure one’s place and 
capacity to earn, total commitment is required, or what amounts to the same thing, offering 
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evidence of total commitment.  Attention is focused on a very narrow present in response to 
its urgent demands.  Any radical change in the future must be forestalled, since the future 
needs to be constructed to meet the demands of the present.  Each person must bear 
responsibility for their conduct and fate alone.  Tanner provides a rich and detailed picture of 
what it means within contemporary capitalism to have one’s life governed by destructive and 
self-destructive practices.  If this is life under sin, where, irrespective of one’s intentions, one 
cannot free oneself from constraint, then it would seem natural to turn to a gospel of 
repentance and grace.  Within the common domain of the conduct of time, Christianity can 
offer a direct challenge by imparting a different spirit, a whole new way of being: being 
liberated from the past, oriented in commitment only towards God, reunited from dispersal in 
separate presents to the eternal consciousness of seeing things as a whole,7 anticipating 
surprise in the future, and cooperating rather than competing with others. 
 Here, I must confess, I have struggled to discern the force of the challenge it makes.  
Could it not be, for example, that force lies on the side of the new spirit of capitalism, and 
Protestantism, while it cannot be idolatrously identified as the spirit of contemporary 
capitalism, is destined to be transmuted into one business venture alongside others?  After all, 
Tanner’s account of the daily practice of repentance and conversion is extremely familiar, 
conforming in terms of recommended conduct to centuries of Protestant sermons.  Nowadays 
Protestants rarely rise up to overthrow capitalism – and such protests, frequent as they were 
in the past, having largely fallen silent.8  Capitalism is not Christianity; but in the battle to 
determine which will govern daily conduct, it  appears, if only for our present brief moment 
in history, that Protestant Christianity is on the losing side.  Moreover, the Protestant motifs 
of freeing from past obligations, offering total commitment, focusing on the present, 
anticipating future benefits, and adapting to the requirements of others – irrespective of one’s 
given role in society – may train the most malleable kind of subjectivity which can be 
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captured and put to work by extrinsic forces.  Even so, where most accounts of this Christian 
conduct are articulated in the discourse of scripture, doctrine, ethics, or the practice of 
holiness mediated by daily prayer and Bible study, Tanner’s account disciplines itself to 
avoid any such mediation, being structured instead by the discourse of Augustinian 
Neoplatonism.9  While monetary and economic metaphors are celebrated and used to the full, 
the only material practices I could find raised for consideration were quitting one’s job as a 
mortgage broker (131), giving up competition (203), and the rejected radical options of 
refocusing on household life, a general strike, or a debt strike (209).  I do not doubt that 
Tanner would not exclude adopting Catholic Social Teaching or a Protestant social ethic as 
authentic if imperfect ways of living out one’s Christian calling.  Yet I would appreciate 
some further clarification of why the conscious strategy has been adopted of refusing to 
discuss how faith offers remedies for the actual ways in which people are constrained to 
exploit others in the ways she has described so copiously. 
 Despite the shared discourse, the book is structured according to a sharp division of 
labour between economic projects, to be pursued within the culture of finance-dominated 
capitalism, and a “religious project” (210) articulated in terms of “value in God’s eyes.” (206)  
While the former is explained in rich, concrete detail, the latter is underdetermined, since it is 
God’s work of grace already achieved rather than human work anyway; the human 
contribution seems to be limited to an admission of failure.  One prays and repents on a daily 
basis; yet one continues to go to work and borrow when necessary – at least now with a 
cleared conscience.  I am at a loss to understand what the devout Christian is to do with 
respect to the ordering of cooperation to fulfil human needs without exploiting others; this 
does not appear to be a significant part of her “religious project”.  How might a Christian 
CEO, financial trader, carwash attendant, homeworker, or unemployed person differ in any 
significant way from the non-Christian?  If it is a matter of refusing to be competitive, then 
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the natural outcome would be that devout Christians fail to be appointed or fall out from 
positions of influence, leaving those who are much more willing to govern themselves 
according to the new spirit of capitalism to further intensify its reach and hold.  This hardly 
constitutes a challenge. 
By refusing to discuss any material mediation of Christian life, Tanner’s project to 
articulate a pure Christian conduct, based around a grace which is entirely unlike the ways of 
this world, is premised upon, and helps to maintain, that sharp separation between economics 
and religion which is so characteristic of the Protestant world.  “Grace remains untouched,” 
(133) safe and sound, immune to the struggles of the world, and in imitation of God, 
Christians are to become more and more unlike anything within the world – perhaps 
progressing towards being untouched in their souls.  Both grace and the Christ who is to be 
imitated appear in Tanner’s account as transcendent signifiers, above and beyond any worldly 
or cultural meaning.  I fear that this is the gospel of Neoplatonism rather than the gospel of 
Christ crucified, who was more than touched; he was, as the gospels repeatedly say, “handed 
over”.10  Likewise, the Eucharist is not untouched but consumed.  Since the Christian gospel 
was first articulated in primarily economic rather than metaphysical terms, I suspect that it 
contains a theological imperative to rethink the sharp division between material conduct and 
grace. 
 It is my philosophical difference from Tanner, however, that I wish to pursue just a 
little further.  For it seems to me that the dynamics of contemporary capitalism she describes 
cannot be accounted for fully within the framework of culture understood in a Foucaultian 
way as government of others and government of self.  For the capitalist spirit only arises 
under specific conditions of market discipline.  Even if the market as a mechanism for 
bringing supply and demand into equilibrium is no more discussed than the market as a moral 
ideal in Tanner’s account, the market is still omnipresent as a machine, external to all cultural 
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variation, imposing its implacable demands.  Again and again, throughout her account, 
Tanner appeals to a necessity which, in Marx’ terminology, is determining in the last 
instance: “Whoever does not adapt his manner of life to the conditions of capitalistic success 
must go under, or at least cannot rise.” (26)  This necessity arises from a machine with the 
following structure: money and finance, as intermediaries in all transactions, measure, 
transact and seek one sole good, profit.  Profit has no culture: it is measured by money 
alone.11  In a first move, financial transactions can be decoupled from interactions with 
producers and consumers in order to become interactions between financial agents 
themselves, making money directly from money through credit and debt.  In this way, money 
and finance escape from the constraints of production and consumption, just as capital can 
likewise be removed from the legal constraints operating within any given territory.  Finance 
is deterritorialized; its freedom consists in its liquidity as a decoded flow.  The outcome of 
this disintermediation, when profit opportunities are scarce, is initially a shortage of money 
for investment and consumption.  In a second move, even though finance is not itself 
productive, it can fall back on production and consumption as credit and debt to substitute for 
the shortage, imposing the requirement of profit maximization.  In this account, while finance 
has a culture and is a product of culture, it is better understood as a machine in the sense in 
which Marx spoke about human alienation and subordination to a machine of its own 
making.  It operates according to the necessity generated by decoupling, liquidity and debt in 
the context of physical human need.  It becomes the exterior environment of all business, 
culture, territory and government.  This is capitalism as a machine.12   
Yet what is the Protestant spirituality Tanner describes if not a process of decoupling, 
liquidity, and debt (to God for the gift of grace) in the quest for the power of salvation?  
Perhaps salvation would be better understood as something offered to others, not 
appropriated for oneself.  Returning, however, to Tanner’s account of capitalism, what she 
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describes is in fact a conjunction of culture and machine:13 like the sorcerer’s apprentice, like 
Goethe’s Faust, culture conjures up a machine, through a kind of alchemical magic, which 
breaks free and dominates it; in turn, the machine relentlessly drives a deeper and deeper 
appropriation of a culture which it itself selects. 
 A first implication is that Weber’s account of the reversal of means and end by 
appealing to religious beliefs to explain apparently irrational conduct becomes unnecessary – 
it is another typical Enlightenment gesture of constructing religion as the other of reason.  Its 
enduring appeal had largely been for theologians and cultural theorists who saw in it an 
escape from Marxist materialism, rather than its historical veracity.  While the Protestant 
work ethic may have been a familiar sight during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
perhaps as a way of adapting Protestantism to capitalism, the Weberian thesis itself 
surrounding the origins of capitalism – always a rather tentative one of ‘resonance’ – is 
historically untenable: for example, instead of using accumulated wealth for thrifty ends, the 
first factory owners were debtors who mortgaged their land in order to build factories in the 
countryside.14  Not that this requires any return to a materialist account of economic base and 
religious superstructure – the actual history of the relation between Puritan sensibilities and 
thrifty economic conduct is far more interesting: it revolves around credit.15  To offer just a 
hint at what is at stake here, in the Puritan era wealth consisted not primarily in possessions, 
money, or the means of production, but in creditworthiness.  Daniel Defoe described this 
perfectly in a passing remark about the impossibility of conducting trade without credit 
(intended primarily in the sense of deferred payment, yet evoking so much more):16 
He that gives no trust, and takes no trust, either by wholesale or by retail, and keeps 
his cash all himself . . . so no body is in debt to him, and all his estate is in his shop; 
but I suppose the Tradesman that trades wholly thus, is not yet born, or if there ever 
were any such, they are all dead [emphasis added].17 
12 
 
Notice just how deep an imbrication of wealth, trust, holiness, credit and grace is entailed in 
keeping one’s estate in one’s reputation before others as well as in their obligations to 
oneself.  This mutual dependency and deep imbrication has not gone away; it has merely 
been institutionalised within money, banking and finance as the dynamic force of capital, the 
hidden daemon of the machine.18 
A second implication is that when faced with an oncoming destructive machine, it is 
largely useless to speak about a change in self-governance (although to repent, weep and pray 
may be the best that some can do, as John the Baptist taught).  It is far better to take the 
machine apart, see how it works, and see if one can make modifications to its components 
(even if this just a matter of drawing circles in the sand, like Archimedes at the moment of his 
death).  A study of the internal dynamics of finance, money and banking is more significant 
than a study of their culture.  A third implication is that capitalism may never have been what 
we thought it was: it has always been finance-dominated.  Debt and mobility have been part 
of human life for a good five millennia, and its mechanisms for controlling subjectivity are no 
more new than the risks involved in living a precarious life.19  Since all the main elements of 
finance were present prior to the rise of industrial capitalism, capitalism – perhaps even in its 
ancient Sumerian and Babylonian forms – has largely been financed-based.  As David 
Graeber has pointed out, even in Marx’ day in London there were far fewer factory labourers 
than there were street-hawkers and prostitutes, while in the colonies, the modern world was 
largely built by slaves, bonded labourers, and debts peons.20  The spirit of capitalism 
described by Tanner is not entirely new.  What has changed might be the extent of markets, 
the liquidity of assets, the turn to the propertied classes as the primary resource for 
exploitation, and the unification of cultures of self-government, but just as debt, competition, 
and precariousness have been historic means of exploitation, so also has indebted 
subjectivity, involving the relation to time and others that Tanner describes.  It is the post-war 
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period of tight capital control, rapid economic growth, and a functioning welfare state that is 
the historical exception rather than the norm. 
 Now, one of the many points over which I do in fact agree with Tanner is over 
refusing a certain kind of Platonic legacy consisting in idealising the past (51): all Christians 
are continually enmeshed in sin.  Such a refusal, I believe, is shared by Singh, motivating his 
study of the fourth century nexus of religion and economics, Divine Currency.  Far from 
accepting a pure theological origin for authorisation and legitimation of doctrine, practice and 
conduct, Singh charts the messy involvement of Patristic theology with the power practices 
and techniques of exploitation conducted by the Roman empire.  If theology inevitably drew 
its discourse from the cultural forms available to it, including practices of economic 
administration, then it preserves the structure of such practices for future eras.  Singh 
explores a two-stage process: the language about the nature and function of money has been 
taken up by theology; subsequently, theological language about debt, payment and exchange 
are imported into descriptions of what money is, should be, and how it is deployed (18).  As 
sanctified discourse, used metaphorically, theology has apparently baptised and purified such 
language from all its exploitative connotations: if God is the true economist, then exploitative 
cultural forms are imperfect and sinful imitations of the divine economy, while more just 
economic practices can be devised by imitating the divine model.  Yet what Singh implies is 
that if economic language itself is used to explain this process of conversion, reminting 
Christians as God’s coins, then the coin produced remains an alloy rather than pure silver.  
The very language of purification becomes a technique in the authorisation and legitimation 
of evolving customs and practices which continue to have exploitative effects – about which 
the Christian now need have little consciousness or concern, since their task is more faithful 
imitation of God who, by definition, cannot in any way be corrupt.  I might be tempted to call 
this a distinctively Christian form of idolatry, one that generates its own image of God 
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through its own penitence (also one largely evaded by Judaism and Islam with their rather 
different cultural practices for maintaining the holiness of God) – it being a Christian 
prerogative endorsed by Tillich’s Protestant Principle (which finds echoes in Tanner’s 
account) to accuse Christianity itself of corruption.  Singh is more consistent than I in 
declining such temptations – perhaps they are a product of the very mechanisms of monetary 
exchange and purification he explores.  Instead, he calls for greater self-reflexivity, 
investigating how “theological and ethical engagements have already helped construct the 
circumstances against which they protest.”  (10)  At stake, here, is perhaps the very character 
of theology itself.  Let me state at the outset that, in contrast with much of the Christian 
tradition, I believe there are good Christian reasons for risking this reflexivity: if Christ was 
“handed over” to the ways of sinful men, it is very likely that theology both is and should be 
too.  My wager is that if Christian theology holds any wealth, it is not the kind of wealth it 
keeps in its own shop; such a wager may be the very meaning of faith. 
 The crucial axis of Singh’s homology between money and Christ is sovereign power: 
money is “a sign and representation of sovereign power inserted into a space or territory to 
aid in the governance of subjects.” (5)  For to pay for goods and services with nothing but a 
coin bearing the stamp of a sovereign is to declare that one’s suppliers are subjected to 
sovereign power: they acknowledge that subjection insofar as they provide goods and 
services for just a token, as if rendering tribute to one who bears the seal of authority of the 
sovereign power.  Of course, in this process, the coin is actually handed over, and the supplier 
now becomes the one who will bear authority in a future exchange.  Yet eventually, this 
authority will have to be accounted for: each person under sovereign authority is required to 
render coins back to the sovereign power in taxation – and as a result, demonstrate that they 
have engaged in deferential conduct by providing goods and services at the mere sign of 
sovereign power.  In the meantime, all are alike subjected under sovereign power and for this 
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reason are able to offer goods and services to each other in exchange for tokens marking 
sovereign approval and authorisation.  As Singh explains, money undergirds and is 
empowered by a notion of territorial and ideological unity, utilising the same tokens of 
power, measure and value issued by sovereign decree (50).  The resonances with Christian 
life and practice are striking, even if no coins are handed over: Christians receive divine grace 
in baptism, being marked with the sign of the cross signifying that they are now under divine 
sovereign power.  In collective life, Christians then act in service to one another, well aware 
that in serving the least of their brethren they are actually rendering service to Christ.  At the 
end, Christians will have to give account of their deeds in the body, showing whether they 
have actually taken up their cross on a daily basis.  In the meantime, all are alike under the 
sovereign power of Christ – in Christ there is no longer Jew or Greek, slave or free, male or 
female – and are thus bearers of Christ’s sign, deserving to be served under his authority.  
One might suggest that in this way Christianity prepares the ground for empire, constructing 
subjects willing to construe themselves as servants to whatever the moment demands, for 
since service is universal, actual demands bear authority whatever their provenance.  When 
there is a job to be done, those who are selected are those who can be relied on, who can 
commit themselves wholeheartedly, bearing the highest cost of physical and mental anguish 
irrespective of the task21 – I am suggesting that the special forces soldier of today offers the 
best embodiment of this one particular aspect of Pauline subjectivity (even if they are 
unlikely to undergo quite as extreme yet fortuitous a set of experiences as Paul himself). 
 This military analogy is far from coincidental: it would seem that the first coins were 
issued to mercenaries by despots.  If one wonders why mercenaries might be willing to fight 
and risk their lives for the sake of mere tokens, prior to the installation of anything like a 
monetary economy, then the answer is clear: such tokens, issued by the grace of the 
sovereign as symbols of patronage and favour, enabled the mercenaries to participate in the 
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prestige and benefits of this sovereign power – a power that actually consisted in that of the 
mercenaries themselves fighting and acting together as one group.  It is such delegated and 
extended symbolic power which is the focus of Singh’s interests, and lest I continue to 
deviate too far from his own account, let me cite in full his concise summary of the military-
coinage-taxation complex: 
The tax circuit gives value to money, and the power to tax reflects sovereignty.  
Without taxation, money as we understand it would not exist.  The imposition of taxes 
renders monetary tokens meaningful and valuable.  As noted, monetary tokens have 
typically been disseminated via occupying military forces or civil servants, as signs of 
ruling power imposed upon the populace in exchange for goods and services.  The 
state as guarantor declared that it would accept these arbitrary tokens back as a way 
for its subjects to discharge their debt of economic fealty.  In so doing, it established a 
monetary circuit, an ebb and flow of tokens that marked relations of credit and debt 
within a territory.  Taxation established the decreed exchange proportions, indicating 
the abstract value of money, as the state declared other acceptable means of in-kind 
payment in terms of their equivalences with the money standard (46-47). 
This is the state theory of money, invented by Georg Knapp and expounded today by Randall 
Wray, according to which markets and debts are enabled by the sovereign and military power 
of the state.  It describes a mechanism of circular flow (a machine) by which a sovereign 
power, through its own initiative, grace or patronage, can expand its territory, its control of 
the populace, and its profit in return.  Each sovereign power demonstrates its authority on 
accession by issuing a new set of coins; it demonstrates its authority over a newly conquered 
populace by extending the circuit of coins.  It is this mechanism which has been taken up and 
reproduced in symbolic terms within the discourse of Patristic theology, especially as 
articulated by Eusebius in his homology between Constantine and Christ, announcing the 
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accession of each as the coming of divine rule.  It is a mechanism which is taken up by 
Gregory of Nyssa in his bait-and-switch model of atonement, where Christ is the gracious 
payment which overcomes the previous Satanic sovereign.  It is a mechanism which seemed 
only too natural to theologian bishops since it had already been taken up in the spiritual 
discipline of almsgiving for the sake of salvation – one that has been occluded especially in 
Protestant thought, but as Countryman and Brown have shown, was central to the early 
church (and it may indeed still motivate a Protestant work ethic).  Almsgiving was directly 
tied to receiving treasure in heaven since it imitated Christ’s own self-giving.  Bishops, who 
were responsible for the collective purse and allocation for the poor, rose to leadership 
through their pastoral responsibilities; the poor, previously overlooked in Roman conceptions 
of public benefaction, patronage, and gift-exchange, were invented as a public concern by 
Christian life and practice and motivated to be incorporated into the life of the Church.  In 
such practices, it was the handling of real money which directly impacted one’s eternal, 
symbolic destiny. 
 One of the great merits of Singh’s account is that, unlike Foucault’s account of the 
origins of modernity in Christian pastoral practices of confession, and unlike Agamben’s 
account of the origins of modernity in Trinitarian considerations, he engages with the 
concrete economy in the form of the exchange of material goods, resources and money.  
While I find Foucault’s and Agamben’s projects to be inconsequential and unconvincing,  
Singh’s wager that “monetized theology has lent itself over the centuries and in various 
permutations to the growth of economic thought and practice in society” (7) seems rather 
more plausible – even if it could only be established by a thorough study of later centuries.  
Once sanitised and converted into an ideal model in theological discourse, the circular flow 
mechanism can be put to work without self-questioning in colonial conquest, in the name of 
the gracious offering of the benefits of trade, civilisation and development, as well as in 
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capitalist investment, graciously investing one’s own wealth in expectation of a return while 
maintaining that it is the other party who is enabled to prosper thereby.  What might be 
troubling here is less extending the benefits of development, enlightenment, stable 
governance, and productive capacity than an inattention to the concomitant subjugation 
involved in taxation and debt – the contemporary experiences of which have been so 
adequately described by Tanner, but do not necessarily differ in kind from the experiences of 
colonial subjects for centuries at the hands of devout Protestant soldiers, slave-owners, 
venture capitalists, colonists and imperial civil servants.  What if the new spirit of capitalism 
simply reveals a very old spirit of Christianity?  This troubling feature reaches back to the 
Christian discipline of almsgiving itself: in Augustine’s struggle to defend the established 
practice of regular almsgiving, for the sake of both the salvation of the rich and the orderly 
and consistent support of the poor, against any Pelagian return to the gospel teachings of 
complete and once for all divestment, what gets missed is the Pelagian complaint about the 
source of wealth itself in conquest, theft, exploitation and the inheritance of their benefits.22  
Whatever its source, wealth could be sanctified when offered back to God as alms for the 
poor.  Likewise, sin can be redeemed when offered symbolically in repentance back to God.  
Such sanctification often merely draws a veil over ongoing injustice.  Perhaps theology itself, 
when constituted as a discourse abstracted from material practices, is merely another form of 
such sanctification, extracting a semantic surplus value – “value in the eyes of God” – from 
conduct that has direct consequences for self and others.  Furthermore, perhaps the cultural 
turn itself, as a totalising move intended to encompass the entirety of material practices under 
the form of conduct, is merely an incarnation of such theology by another name, locking 
sovereignty in conquest with sovereignty, right against right, conduct against counter-
conduct, power against resistance.23  After all, what do scholars do but translate the whole of 
human experience into the semantic realm?  What I fear is the drawing of a veil over what 
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cannot be reinscribed within a frame of cultural meaning – a veil which may continue to 
render certain aspects of life all but invisible. 
 On this note, it is now time to return to indicate some difference from Singh.  The 
mechanism at the heart of Singh’s account is the state theory of money, and this of course is 
by far the most pertinent to the expansion of the Roman empire, the origins of Christianity, 
and the fourth century conjunction of economic practice and theological discourse.  It situates 
the function of money entirely in relation to a sovereign territory subject to governance.  Yet 
coins also circulate widely beyond their territories of issue if people are willing to accept 
them in exchange; they can also be replicated by anyone who writes a promissory note, an 
IOU, which can in turn be transferred by its recipient when paying a third party.  The recent 
consensus of scholars, as Singh is well aware, is that not only is it the case that the barter 
theory of the origins of money is untenable, but that money and its value are constituted by 
the conjunction of state, market, and credit.24  In other words, in addition to its symbolic 
functions which reinforce and enact sovereign power, money also has the tendency to escape 
the control of any territory as well as to reconstitute and reproduce itself through transferrable 
debts – it has emergent dynamics.  The most that governance of money can hope for is some 
stability through controlling interest rates and inflation; sovereignty is exposed to forces 
beyond its control.  In a most interesting recent article, Singh has explored how sovereignty 
itself is established and maintains itself in and through debt25 – this seems to me to be a 
considerable advance over the paradigm operative in Divine Currency.  There are other 
phenomena at work beyond the governance of self and governance of others. 
If one returns to the Christian symbolic register with these considerations in mind, one 
may note how unlike Roman imperialism Christianity was.  In serving one another, no coin 
or currency is handed over.  The Eucharist is not a circular flow nor a medium of exchange.  
The poor are not (necessarily) required to pay tithes back to the Church.  Christ himself was 
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handed over.  The material logic is different, even if this has often been obscured by the 
homologies in discourse.  Christianity is more than a regime of governance of conduct, more 
than a regime of grace and obligation; it involves direct exposure to the forces of the outside. 
 This, I believe, is the conclusion that can be drawn from Singh’s work: Christian 
theology has never been able to constitute an enclosed, ordered, and governed semantic 
territory; it has always been exposed to disturbances from outside.  Of course, in response to 
such disruption, the main thrust of theological endeavour has been to seek the semantic 
coinage which will effectively establish complete divine dominion, a core of sovereign grace 
untouched by the world.  That such a response is driven by a lack of faith could only ever be 
a minority opinion.  That Christian theology could be pursued beyond its own semantic 
register within territories where it holds no privilege or sovereign power of conversion is a 
position that is almost imperceptible. 
 Let me conclude by indicating a path economic theology might take from here.  The 
human condition is such that we are exposed to forces beyond the conduct of ourselves and 
others – the flow of time, ecological instabilities, credit crises, abstract machines, sin and 
grace.  Finance-dominated capitalism, currently unchecked in its machinic necessity, is 
producing the apocalypse of climate change and biodiversity loss which human civilisation in 
its current forms may not survive.  By means of decoupling, liquidity, competition and debt, 
it is reconstituting economic relations as a war of all against all.  At the same time, as 
neoliberal subjects assert more volubly their unmediated rights, agreement through 
democratic deliberation is harder to achieve, and the clash of populisms under conditions of 
scarcity is a harbinger of the potential for future total wars. 
 A first task is to locate the common domain of economics and theology in the human 
relation to what is beyond its control – not in discourse, culture, governance, or desire, but in 
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trust, credit and faith.  This new foundation enables a rethinking of Christian theology as 
constituted by its conduct towards what lies outside it, where credit and faith are required: at 
once the material conditions surrounding the satisfaction of human needs and the spiritual 
conditions enabling the distribution of care and attention, credit and evaluation, and trust and 
cooperation.  Alongside this, a new story of the origins of capitalism out of Christianity can 
be told once credit, which hands over care, value and trust, is ordered by debt, a promise of 
definite value by a definite time.  In a fundamental reversal, capitalism emerged out of 
Christianity by offering an alchemical multiplication of debt as a basis for trust.  I have tried 
to offer an account of this in my forthcoming Credit and Faith.26  A second task is to take 
apart the capitalist machine as an ordering of trust, in itself a theology, exploring the function 
of the ideology of the market as a component in its structure, the disequilibrium dynamics by 
which it actually functions, and the focal role of finance as at once a failed means of salvation 
seeking to restore the ideal market and at the same time the condition of possibility of modern 
economic life.  I have tried to offer an account of this in my forthcoming Economic Theology.  
Once the common domain between economics and theology has been established, and credit 
and faith are understood in relation to each other, a third task is to rethink the conditions 
which underpin a more creditworthy allocation of trust.  A renewed ontological framework, 
disclosing a deeper meaning for appropriation and wealth, for participation and power, and 
for grace and necessity, has been offered in my forthcoming Metaphysics of Trust. 
Of course, many might seek to reassure me that culture does indeed encompass 
everything, that there are no decoded flows or machines, and conduct can indeed be governed 
and reformed – such might be read as the implicit message of Tanner and Singh’s projects if 
ever called to address the thesis of my Theology of Money.27  My response is simple: come 
back to me when you have succeeded in governing the flow of time.  In the meantime, do not 
disturb my circles. 
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